This morning, the New Jersey Supreme Court ruled that our State Constitution provides people in New Jersey with a right of privacy related to the subscriber information they provide to their internet service providers. As a result of this privacy interest, state and municipal law enforcement agencies that seek this information must do so in a reasonable manner. This can be lawfully accomplished through the issuance of a grand jury subpoena. Moreover, the target of the grand jury investigation need not be informed that his internet records have been sought and obtained through this method.

In this morning’s case, State v. Reid, the police utilized an improperly issued municipal court subpoena duces tecum in order to obtain subscriber information related to a criminal suspect from the internet service provider, Comcast. The Supreme Court held that this procedure was unconstitutional in that it violated the suspect’s privacy interest in her subscriber information. Accordingly, the evidence obtained must be suppressed and the resulting indictment will probably be dismissed. However, the Court went on to hold that the information sought by the police in this case can still be obtained through the use of a properly issued a grand jury subpoena, which may result in a new indictment for the defendant.



*********************************************************

SYLLABUS


(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the
convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the
interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized).

State of New Jersey v. Shirley Reid (A-105-06)

Argued October 22, 2007 -- Decided April 21, 2008

Rabner, C.J., writing for a unanimous Court.

This case involves multi-digit numbers called IP addresses that Internet Service Providers (ISPs) assign to
subscribers for use in accessing Internet websites. Websites may collect the numbers, but with the technology
available today only the ISP that assigned the address can translate it into the name of an actual user. In this context,
the Court considers whether Internet subscribers have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their identities while
accessing Internet websites.

On August 27, 2004, Jersey Diesel's owner, Timothy Wilson, was informed by a supplier that Jersey Diesel's
shipping address and password had been changed on the supplier's website. Specifically, the supplier's information
technology specialist determined that on August 24, 2004, someone had accessed the website, used Jersey Diesel's
username and password to sign on, changed Jersey Diesel's address to a non-existent address, and changed the
password. The supplier's website captured the user's IP address, which was registered to Comcast. Although
Wilson contacted Comcast and requested the subscriber information for the IP address so that he could identify the
person who made the unauthorized changes, Comcast declined to respond without a subpoena.

Wilson reported the incident to the Lower Township Police Department and suggested that Shirley Reid, an
employee who had been on disability leave, could have made the changes. Reid had returned to work on the
morning of August 24, argued with Wilson, and left. According to Wilson, Reid was the only employee who knew
the company's computer password and ID.

On September 7, 2004, a subpoena duces tecum issued by the Lower Township Municipal Court was served on
Comcast. The subpoena sought all information pertaining to the IP address identified by the supplier for the
appropriate time period on August 24th. The subpoena was captioned "Timothy C. Wilson, Plaintiff, vs. Shirley
Reed [sic], Defendant," although no such case was pending. On September 16, 2004, Comcast responded and
identified Reid as the subscriber of the IP address. Comcast also provided Reid's address, telephone number, type of
service provided, IP assignment, account number, e-mail address, and method of payment.

On February 22, 2005, the Cape May County Grand Jury returned an indictment charging Reid with second-
degree computer theft. Reid moved to suppress the evidence. The trial court granted the motion. The court
identified various flaws in the subpoena and noted that the procedure followed by the police was unauthorized. The
court also concluded that Reid had an expectation of privacy in her Internet subscriber information on file with
Comcast, therefore the subpoena violated Reid's right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.

In a published opinion, the Appellate Division affirmed. 389 N.J. Super. 563 (2007). The panel found the
subpoena invalid because it was not issued in connection with any judicial proceeding, was returnable the same day
it was issued, and involved an indictable offense outside the jurisdiction of the Municipal Court. The panel also
concluded that Reid had a protected privacy interest under the State Constitution in the information provided by
Comcast and, as a result, the method used by the police to obtain the information warranted suppression.

HELD: Pursuant to Article I, Paragraph 7, of the New Jersey Constitution, the Court holds that citizens have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the subscriber information they provide to Internet service providers.
Accordingly, the motion to suppress by defendant Reid was properly granted because the police used a deficient
municipal subpoena. Law enforcement officials can obtain subscriber information by serving a grand jury subpoena
on an Internet service provider without notice to the subscriber. The State may seek to reacquire the information
with a proper grand jury subpoena because records of the information existed independently of the faulty process


used by the police, and the conduct of the police did not affect the information.

1. Both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Paragraph 7, of the New Jersey
Constitution protect the right of the people to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures. Federal case
law interpreting the Fourth Amendment has found no expectation of privacy in Internet subscriber information. On
multiple occasions, however, this Court has held that the New Jersey Constitution affords greater protection than the
Fourth Amendment. In State v. Hunt, 91 N.J. 338 (1982), this Court concluded that telephone toll billing records are
protected and explained that citizens are entitled to assume that the numbers they dial in the privacy of their home
will be recorded solely for the telephone company's business purposes. Similarly, in State v. McAllister, 184 N.J. 17
(2005), the Court held that the New Jersey Constitution provides bank account holders a reasonable expectation of
privacy in their bank records. (Pp. 12—15).
2. It is well-settled under New Jersey law that disclosure to a third-party provider, as an essential step to obtaining
service altogether, does not upend the privacy interest at stake. In order to access the Web, individuals must obtain
an IP address from an ISP. Users make disclosures to ISPs for the limited goal of using the technology and not to
promote the release of personal information to others. IP address information can be used to track a person's Internet
usage, revealing intimate details about his or her personal affairs. Because current technology renders the user's
identity anonymous to all except the ISP, users have reason to expect that their actions are confidential when they
surf the Web from the privacy of their homes. Therefore, the Court holds that Article I, Paragraph 7, of the New
Jersey Constitution protects an individual's privacy interest in the subscriber information that he or she provides to
an ISP. (Pp. 15—21).
3. In State v. McAllister, the Court concluded that the constitutional protection against improper government
intrusion is satisfied by the issuance of a grand jury subpoena providing that the bank records bear some possible
relationship to the grand jury investigation. The Court adopts the same standard for the records at issue in this
matter. As in McAllister, the Court also declines to adopt a requirement that notice be provided to account holders
whose information is subpoenaed. Unscrupulous individuals aware of subpoenas could delete or damage files on
their home computers and thereby effectively shield them from legitimate investigations. (Pp. 21—25).
4. Here, the subscriber information was suppressed because the police department used a defective municipal
subpoena. Evidence discovered, directly or indirectly, as a result of a constitutional violation must be suppressed.
However, unlike a confession coerced from a defendant in violation of that individuals constitutional rights,
Comcast's records existed independently of the faulty process the police followed. Moreover, evidence of Reid's
knowledge of the company's password, her argument with Wilson, as well as the supplier’s information about the IP
address used to access its website remains untainted by the results of the defective municipal subpoena. Because the
subscriber information attached to that particular IP address bore some possible relationship to the investigation
underway, the State may attempt to reacquire Comcast's records with a proper grand jury subpoena limited to
seeking subscriber information for the IP address in question. (Pp. 25—29).
5. The trial court properly suppressed the subscriber information obtained, and the State may not proceed with the
pending indictment absent proof that the indictment has a sufficient basis without relying on the suppressed
evidence. Alternatively, the State may move to dismiss the pending indictment, re-serve a proper grand jury
subpoena on Comcast, and seek a new indictment. (P. 29).
The judgment of the Appellate Division is MODIFIED and AFFIRMED and the matter is REMANDED to the
Law Division for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

JUSTICES LONG, LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, WALLACE, RIVERA-SOTO and HOENS join in CHIEF
JUSTICE RABNER's opinion.

2



SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
A-105 September Term 2006

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.
SHIRLEY REID,

Defendant-Respondent.

Argued October 22, 2007 – Decided April 21, 2008

On appeal from the Superior Court, AppellateDivision, whose opinion is reported at 389

N.J. Super. 563 (2007).
Steven A. Yomtov, Deputy Attorney General,
argued the cause for appellant (AnneMilgram, Attorney General of New Jersey,
attorney).

Joseph C. Grassi argued the cause forrespondent (Barry, Corrado, Grassi & Gibson,
attorneys; Mr. Grassi and Frank L. Corrado,
of counsel and on the briefs).

Rubin M. Sinins argued the cause for amicuscuriae Association of Criminal Defense
Lawyers of New Jersey (Javerbaum WurgaftHicks Kahn Wikstrom & Sinins, attorneys).

Grayson Barber submitted a brief on behalf
of amici curiae American Civil Liberties
Union of New Jersey, Electronic FrontierFoundation, Electronic Privacy InformationCenter, Freedom To Read Foundation, PrivacyRights Clearinghouse and New Jersey LibraryAssociation (Ms. Barber, attorney; Ms.
Barber and Edward L. Barocas, on the brief).


CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER delivered the opinion of the Court.

Modern technology has raised a number of questions that are
intertwined in this case: To what extent can private
individuals “surf” the “Web” anonymously? Do Internet
subscribers have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their
identity while accessing Internet websites? And under what
circumstances may the State learn the actual identity of
Internet users?

In this case, defendant Shirley Reid allegedly logged onto
an Internet website from her home computer. The site belonged
to a company that supplied material to her employer’s business.
While on the supplier’s website, Reid allegedly changed her
employer’s password and shipping address to a non-existent
address.

Whenever an individual logs onto an Internet website, that
user’s identity is revealed only in the form of a unique multi-
digit number (an “IP address”) assigned by the user’s Internet
Service Provider (“ISP”). A website may collect that number,
but only a service provider can translate it into the name of an
actual user or subscriber.

Here, the supplier’s website captured a 10-digit IP
address, and the supplier told Reid’s employer what had
occurred. The employer, in turn, reported the IP address to
local authorities. They issued a deficient municipal subpoena

2



to Comcast, the service provider, and Comcast revealed that the
IP address was assigned to Shirley Reid.

Reid is now under indictment for second-degree computer
theft. She successfully moved to suppress the subscriber
information obtained via the municipal subpoena.

We now hold that citizens have a reasonable expectation of
privacy, protected by Article I, Paragraph 7, of the New Jersey
Constitution, in the subscriber information they provide to
Internet service providers -- just as New Jersey citizens have a
privacy interest in their bank records stored by banks and
telephone billing records kept by phone companies. Law
enforcement officials can satisfy that constitutional protection
and obtain subscriber information by serving a grand jury
subpoena on an ISP without notice to the subscriber.

Because the police used a deficient municipal subpoena to
obtain protected subscriber information in this case,
defendant’s motion to suppress was properly granted. However,
records of the protected subscriber information existed
independently of the faulty process the police used, and the
conduct of the police did not affect that information. As a
result, the State may seek to reacquire the subscriber
information with a proper grand jury subpoena.

3



I.
A.
Some background information about computers and the
Internet may assist in evaluating the issues presented. The
Internet is a global network of computers that allows for the
“sharing” or “networking” of information to and from remote
locations. See Harry Newton, Newton’s Telecom Dictionary 502
(23rd ed. 2007). Users of the Internet can send electronic
mail, share files, and explore or “surf” the World Wide Web
(“Web”), a graphical computer-based information network. Id. at
502-03. While surfing the Web, a user can visit and interact
with sites maintained by businesses, educational institutions,
governments, and individuals, which cover almost every
conceivable topic.

An individual customer must select an Internet Service
Provider like Comcast, AOL, or Verizon, in order to connect to
the Internet. See, e.g., id. at 107. To sign up for service, a
customer must disclose personal information including one’s
name, billing information, phone number, and home address.

To interact with other computers also attached to the
Internet, a computer must be assigned an Internet Protocol
address, or IP address. Id. at 342. An IP address is a string
of up to twelve numbers separated by dots -- for example,

123.45.67.89. Ibid. In certain situations, a computer is
4



assigned a permanent IP address, called a static IP address.
Ibid. Most often, when an individual connects to the Internet,
his or her Internet Service Provider dynamically assigns an IP
address to the computer, which can change every time the user
accesses the Internet. Ibid. In other words, the “dynamic” IP
address assigned to the computer can be different for each
Internet session. Ibid.

The American Registry for Internet Numbers (ARIN) is in
charge of assigning IP addresses within North America. See
www.arin.net/index.shtml. Anyone acquiring an IP
address must register and provide ARIN certain contact
information, which ARIN makes publicly available. Ibid.
However, most Internet users do not obtain IP addresses
directly from ARIN; they instead “lease” an IP address from a
service provider like Comcast, which is the actual, named
registrant. See RIR Comparative Policy Overview (2008),
www.nro.net/documents/nro47.html (last visited April 16,
2008) (linked to ARIN website).

When an Internet user surfs the Web, sends e-mail, or
shares a file, any site the user connects to can collect certain
information, including the user’s IP address. See Newton,
supra, at 506. However, the sites ordinarily cannot identify
the name of an individual user. Only the ISP can match the name
of the customer to a dynamic IP address.

5



Recently, IP Address Locator Websites have become available
to the general public.1 Such websites operate similarly to a
reverse phone directory: they permit a person to type in an IP
address and obtain the name and location of the registrant for
that address. Once again, because most Internet users access
the Internet via third-party service providers like AOL,
Comcast, Yahoo, and others, Address Locator Websites typically
reveal the name and location of the service provider -- such as
Comcast -- but not information about the individual user.

Thus, even with the advent of IP Address Locator Websites,
most users continue to enjoy relatively complete IP address
anonymity when surfing the Web.

B.
The facts of this case are not in dispute. On August 27,
2004, Timothy Wilson, the owner of Jersey Diesel, reported to
the Lower Township Police Department that someone had used a
computer to change his company’s shipping address and password
for its suppliers. The shipping address was changed to a nonexistent
address.

In response to a question by the police, Wilson explained
that Shirley Reid, an employee who had been on disability leave,

Websites providing this service include: GeoBytes IP AddressLocator Tool, www.geobytes.com/IpLocator.htm; IPaddress.
com, www.ip-adress.com/ipaddresstolocation/; andIP Address Location, www.ipaddresslocation.org/.

6



could have made the changes. Reid returned to work on the
morning of August 24, had an argument with Wilson about her
temporary light duty assignment, and left. According to Wilson,
Reid was the only employee who knew the company’s computer
password and ID.

Wilson learned of the changes through one of his suppliers,
Donaldson Company, Inc. Both the password and shipping address
for Jersey Diesel had been changed on Donaldson’s website on
August 24, 2004. According to an information technology
specialist at Donaldson, someone accessed their website and used
Jersey Diesel’s username and password to sign on at 9:57 a.m.
The individual changed the password and Jersey Diesel’s shipping
address and then completed the requests at 10:07 a.m.

Donaldson’s website captured the user’s IP address,
68.32.145.220, which was registered to Comcast. When Wilson
contacted Comcast and asked for subscriber information
associated with that address -- so that he could identify the
person who made the unauthorized changes -- Comcast declined to
respond without a subpoena.

On September 7, 2004, a subpoena duces tecum issued by the
Lower Township Municipal Court was served on Comcast. The
subpoena sought “[a]ny and all information pertaining to IP
Address information belonging to IP address: 68.32.145.220,
which occurred on 08/24/04 between 8:00 a.m. and 11:00 a.m.

7



EST.” The subpoena was captioned “Timothy C. Wilson, Plaintiff,
vs. Shirley Reed [sic], Defendant,” although no such case was
pending.

Comcast responded on September 16, 2004 and identified Reid
as the subscriber of the IP address. In addition, Comcast
provided the following information: Reid’s address, telephone
number, type of service provided, IP assignment (dynamic),
account number, e-mail address, and method of payment.

An arrest warrant was issued on September 29, 2004, and
Reid was arrested ten days later. On February 22, 2005, the
Cape May County Grand Jury returned an indictment charging Reid
with second-degree computer theft, in violation of N.J.S.A.
2C:20-25(b).

Reid moved to suppress the evidence obtained via the
municipal court subpoena. On September 22, 2005, the trial
court granted Reid’s motion. The court identified various flaws
with the municipal court subpoena and noted that the procedure
followed by the police was “unauthorized in its entirety.” The
court also concluded that Reid had an expectation of privacy in
her Internet subscriber information on file with Comcast.
Therefore, the trial court held that the subpoena violated
Reid’s “right to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures” and was unconstitutional.

8



The Appellate Division, in a published opinion, affirmed
the order of suppression. State v. Reid, 389 N.J. Super. 563
(App. Div.), appeal granted, 190 N.J. 250 (2007). First, the
panel found the subpoena invalid for a number of reasons: it
was not issued in connection with any judicial proceeding; was
returnable the same day it was issued; and involved an
indictable offense outside the jurisdiction of the Municipal
Court. Id. at 568. Next, the panel concluded that Reid had a
protected privacy interest under the State Constitution in the
subscriber information obtained from Comcast. As a result, the
method the police used to obtain that information warranted
suppression.

The panel reasoned that “New Jersey appears to have
recognized a right to what has been called ‘informational
privacy.’” Id. at 570. Quoting from a law review article, the
court adopted the following formulation of that right:

[informational privacy] encompasses anyinformation that is identifiable to an
individual. This includes both assignedinformation, such as a name, address, orsocial security number, and generatedinformation, such as financial or credit
card records, medical records, and phonelogs . . . . [P]ersonal information will bedefined as any information, no matter howtrivial, that can be traced or linked to anidentifiable individual.

9



[Ibid. (quoting Elbert Lin, PrioritizingPrivacy: A Constitutional Response to theInternet, 17 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1085, 109697
(2002)).]

In support of this precept, the panel cited to State v. Hunt, 91

N.J. 338 (1982), State v. Hempele, 120 N.J. 182 (1990), and
State v. McAllister, 184 N.J. 17 (2005).
The panel concluded that information on file with Comcast
concerning the identity of Internet users fell within the
protected privacy right. Accordingly, that information could
“only be obtained by law enforcement through some means of
proper judicial process.” Reid, supra, 389 N.J. Super. at 575.

On March 15, 2007, this Court granted the State’s motion
for leave to appeal. 190 N.J. 250 (2007).

II.
The State contends that there is no reasonable expectation
of privacy in subscriber information provided to one’s ISP. The
State submits that State v. Evers, 175 N.J. 355 (2003), has
already resolved that question. Because no constitutional
violation occurred, the State asserts that suppression of the
evidence obtained through the invalid municipal court subpoena
is not required.

If the Court were to recognize a privacy interest, the
State argues that a grand jury subpoena would be legally
sufficient to gain access to subscriber information, consistent

10



with the holdings in McAllister, supra, 184 N.J. 17, and State

v. Domicz, 188 N.J. 285 (2006). Notice to a subscriber should
not be required, the State maintains, because that would
“severely impede investigations into criminal activity.” The
State also points to New Jersey’s Wiretapping and Electronic
Surveillance Control Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:156A-1 to -34 -- and to
N.J.S.A. 2A:156A-29 in particular -- as authority for the use of
grand jury or trial subpoenas to obtain ISP subscriber
information.
Reid asks us to affirm the Appellate Division’s holding and
find a constitutional right of privacy in internet subscriber
information. Reid argues that Evers, supra, did not settle the
issue. In addition, Reid submits that suppression is the proper
remedy for a violation of her constitutional right.

Reid also urges this Court to require notice to the
Internet user whenever the government, using judicial process,
seeks subscriber information from an ISP. The State could avoid
the notice requirement in a given case if it were able to
justify an exception to that rule.

We granted amicus curiae status to the Association of
Criminal Defense Lawyers of New Jersey (ACDL) as well as the
American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey (ACLU). (The ACLU
submitted a brief on behalf of itself and the Electronic
Frontier Foundation, Electronic Privacy Information Center,

11



Freedom to Read Foundation, Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, and
New Jersey Library Association.)

All amici contend that there is a reasonable expectation of
privacy under the New Jersey Constitution with regard to ISP
subscriber information. They also argue for contemporaneous
notice to the Internet user when the government seeks such
information. In case of a violation of the constitutionally
protected privacy right, they argue that suppression is
required. They submit that statutory civil remedies are
insufficient to protect an individual’s right of privacy.

III.
We first consider the existence of a New Jersey citizen’s
privacy interest in Internet subscriber information.

A.
Both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
and Article I, Paragraph 7, of the New Jersey Constitution
protect, in nearly identical language, “the right of the people
to be secure . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures.”

Federal case law interpreting the Fourth Amendment has
found no expectation of privacy in Internet subscriber
information. See Guest v. Leis, 255 F.3d 325, 336 (6th Cir.
2001); Freedman v. America Online, Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 174,
181 (D. Conn. 2005); United States v. Sherr, 400 F. Supp. 2d
843, 848 (D. Md. 2005); United States v. Cox, 190 F. Supp. 2d

12



330, 332 (N.D.N.Y. 2002); United States v. Kennedy, 81 F. Supp.
2d 1103, 1110 (D. Kans. 2000); United States v. Hambrick, 55 F.
Supp. 2d 504, 508-09 (W.D. Va. 1999), aff’d, 225 F.3d 656 (4th
Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1099, 121 S. Ct. 832, 148 L.
Ed. 2d 714 (2001). Those decisions draw on settled federal law
that a person has no reasonable expectation of privacy in
information exposed to third parties, like a telephone company
or bank. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742, 99 S. Ct.
2577, 2581, 61 L. Ed. 2d 220, 227 (1979) (finding no privacy
interest in telephone numbers dialed); United States v. Miller,
425 U.S. 435, 442, 96 S. Ct. 1619, 1624, 48 L. Ed. 2d 71, 79
(1976) (finding no privacy interest in bank records). The logic
of those precedents extends to subscriber information revealed
to an ISP.

Our inquiry does not end there because “despite the
congruity of the language,” the search and seizure protections
in the federal and New Jersey Constitutions “are not always
coterminous.” Hunt, supra, 91 N.J. at 344. Indeed, on multiple
occasions this Court has held that the New Jersey Constitution
“affords our citizens greater protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures” than the Fourth Amendment. State v.
Novembrino, 105 N.J. 95, 145 (1987) (finding that Article I,
Paragraph 7, unlike Fourth Amendment, does not provide good-
faith exception to exclusionary rule); see also Planned

13



Parenthood of Cent. N.J. v. Farmer, 165 N.J. 609, 629 (2000)
(noting New Jersey’s “long-standing history” of commitment to
protection of privacy rights); Doe v. Poritz, 142 N.J. 1, 89-90
(1995) (noting “a constitutional right of privacy in . . . the
disclosure of confidential or personal information”).

During the past twenty-five years, a series of New Jersey
cases has expanded the privacy rights enjoyed by citizens of
this state. In 1982, this Court concluded in Hunt, supra, that
telephone toll billing records are “part of the privacy
package.” 91 N.J. at 347. In language that resonates today on
the subject of computers, the Court observed that “[t]he
telephone has become an essential instrument in carrying on our
personal affairs.” Id. at 346. Moreover, a list of telephone
numbers dialed in the privacy of one’s home “‘could reveal the
identities of the persons and the places called, and thus reveal
the most intimate details of a person’s life.’” Id. at 347
(quoting Smith, supra, 442 U.S. at 748, 99 S. Ct. at 2584, 61 L.
Ed. 2d at 231 (Stewart, J., dissenting)).

Finding that Article I, Paragraph 7, of the New Jersey
Constitution provides more protection than federal law affords,
this Court concluded that a person “is entitled to assume that
the numbers he dials in the privacy of his home will be recorded
solely for the telephone company’s business purposes.” Id. at

14



345, 347. The Court rejected the underpinnings of federal case

law by explaining that

[i]t is unrealistic to say that the cloak ofprivacy has been shed because the telephonecompany and some of its employees are awareof this information. . . . This disclosure
has been necessitated because of the nature
of the instrumentality, but more
significantly the disclosure has been madefor a limited business purpose and not forrelease to other persons for other reasons.

[Id. at 347.]

More recently, in McAllister, supra, this Court held that

the New Jersey Constitution provides bank account holders a

reasonable expectation of privacy in their bank records. 184

N.J. at 32-33. As in Hunt, the Court noted that bank accounts
“have become an indispensable part of modern commerce” for our
citizens. Id. at 31. Like long distance billing records, bank
records reveal a great deal about the personal affairs,
opinions, habits, and associations of depositors. Id. at 30-31.
The Court also noted that, although bank customers voluntarily
provide information to banks, “they do so with the understanding
that it will remain confidential.” Id. at 31. The disclosure
is done to facilitate financial transactions, not to enable
banks to broadcast the affairs of their customers.
B.
ISP records share much in common with long distance billing
information and bank records. All are integrally connected to

15



essential activities of today’s society. Indeed, it is hard to
overstate how important computers and the Internet have become
to everyday, modern life. Citizens routinely access the Web for
all manner of daily activities: to gather information, explore
ideas, read, study, shop, and more.

Individuals need an ISP address in order to access the
Internet. However, when users surf the Web from the privacy of
their homes, they have reason to expect that their actions are
confidential. Many are unaware that a numerical IP address can
be captured by the websites they visit. More sophisticated
users understand that that unique string of numbers, standing
alone, reveals little if anything to the outside world. Only an
Internet service provider can translate an IP address into a
user’s name.

In addition, while decoded IP addresses do not reveal the
content of Internet communications, subscriber information alone
can tell a great deal about a person. With a complete listing
of IP addresses, one can track a person’s Internet usage. “The
government can learn the names of stores at which a person
shops, the political organizations a person finds interesting, a
person’s . . . fantasies, her health concerns, and so on.”
Daniel Solove, The Future of Internet Surveillance Law, 72 Geo.
Wash. L. Rev. 1264, 1287 (2004). Such information can reveal

16



intimate details about one’s personal affairs in the same way
disclosure of telephone billing records does. Although the
contents of Internet communications may be even more revealing,
both types of information implicate privacy interests.

The State compares IP addresses to the return addresses
found on the outside of envelopes, which carry no privacy
protection. But there is an important difference: letter
writers choose to include their address on an envelope. They
may also opt for anonymity and list no return address. Internet
users have no such choice because they must have an IP address
to access a website. In addition, the string of numbers that
comprises an IP address and can be collected by a website is
both less revealing and less public than a name or street
address posted on an envelope.

It is well-settled under New Jersey law that disclosure to
a third-party provider, as an essential step to obtaining
service altogether, does not upend the privacy interest at
stake. See McAllister, supra, 184 N.J. at 31; Hunt, supra, 91

N.J. at 347. In the world of the Internet, the nature of the
technology requires individuals to obtain an IP address to
access the Web. Users make disclosures to ISPs for the limited
goal of using that technology and not to promote the release of
17



personal information to others. Under our precedents, users are
entitled to expect confidentiality under these circumstances.2

For all of those reasons, we find that Article I, Paragraph
7, of the New Jersey Constitution protects an individual’s
privacy interest in the subscriber information he or she
provides to an Internet service provider.3

This Court’s decision in Evers does not hold otherwise. In
Evers, a deputy sheriff in California was investigating the use
of child pornography on the Internet. He connected to AOL,
entered a chat room whose name suggested sexual activity
involving children, and sent an e-mail that allowed other AOL
subscribers interested in the subject matter to communicate with
him. Evers, supra, 175 N.J. at 365. He received responses from
ninety-eight different screen names, including one response
containing images of a nude female child in a sexually

2 Users, of course, may waive their expectation ofconfidentiality in any number of ways. People routinelyidentify themselves on a website when they make a purchase orcomplete a survey. Likewise, employees often waive any privacyinterests in their use of work-related computers as a conditionof employment. No such waiver occurred here.

3 We decline to adopt the “informational privacy” standardoutlined by the Appellate Division. See Reid, supra, 389 N.J.
Super. at 570. The contours and breadth of the standard are not
entirely clear, and we need not address those issues inresolving the narrower constitutional question before us. See
Bell v. Twp. of Stafford, 110 N.J. 384, 389 (1988) (court shouldnot reach constitutional issues unless absolutely imperative todispose of the litigation). The privacy right established herepertains to subscriber information held by an ISP.

18



provocative position. That response was also sent to fifty
other users. Ibid.

The deputy obtained a search warrant to learn the
identities associated with the ninety-eight screen names and
served the warrant on AOL’s corporate headquarters in Dulles,
Virginia. AOL, in turn, provided names and billing addresses
for the requested screen names. Ibid. Because the person who
sent the pornographic images resided in Nutley, New Jersey, the
deputy forwarded the information to the Nutley Police
Department. The Department acquired a warrant to search
defendant’s house. Id. at 366.

Evers claimed he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in
the contents of the e-mail of the nude girl. This Court quickly
dispensed with his argument, noting that Evers had forwarded the
e-mail to fifty-one recipients at his peril that one of them
would disclose his wrongdoing. Id. at 370.

The Court next asked whether defendant had a privacy
interest in the subscriber information stored at AOL
headquarters in Virginia. Ibid. Without reaching the
substantive question under New Jersey law, the Court
acknowledged that “[n]o purpose would be served by applying New
Jersey’s constitutional standards to people and places over
which the sovereign power of the state has no power or control.”
Id. at 371 (citing State v. Mollica, 114 N.J. 329, 347 (1989)).

19



As a result, the Court declined to hold, as a matter of New
Jersey law, that defendant had a privacy right in the subscriber
information at AOL headquarters in Virginia, sought by a
California law enforcement officer. Ibid. Because no privacy
right existed under federal law, for reasons discussed above,
the Court concluded that defendant had no privacy interest in
the subscriber information. Id. at 374. Viewed in its entire
context, Evers saved for another day the issue we now address.

The New Jersey Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance
Control Act (“Wiretap Act”), N.J.S.A. 2A:156A-1 to -34, offers
additional support for concluding that internet users have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in their own subscriber
information kept by an ISP. The Wiretap Act provides for
disclosure of subscriber information, including name, address,
telephone number, and means of payment, only when a law
enforcement agency obtains “a grand jury or trial subpoena or
when the State Commission of Investigation issues a subpoena.”

N.J.S.A. 2A:156A-29(f). The Legislature’s decision to protect
disclosure of ISP information absent a subpoena is consistent
with the privacy protection we recognize today.
One additional point bears mention about the right to
privacy in ISP subscriber information: the reasonableness of
the privacy interest may change as technology evolves. A
reasonable expectation of privacy is required to establish a

20



protected privacy interest. Hempele, supra, 120 N.J. at 200.
As discussed in section I(A), supra, Internet users today enjoy
relatively complete IP address anonymity when surfing the Web.
Given the current state of technology, the dynamic, temporarily
assigned, numerical IP address cannot be matched to an
individual user without the help of an ISP. Therefore, we
accept as reasonable the expectation that one’s identity will
not be discovered through a string of numbers left behind on a
website.

The availability of IP Address Locator Websites has not
altered that expectation because they reveal the name and
address of service providers but not individual users. Should
that reality change over time, the reasonableness of the
expectation of privacy in Internet subscriber information might
change as well. For example, if one day new software allowed
individuals to type IP addresses into a “reverse directory” and
identify the name of a user -- as is possible with reverse
telephone directories -- today’s ruling might need to be
reexamined.

C.
We turn next to the type of protection ISP subscriber
information should receive in the face of legitimate
investigative needs. The Appellate Division found that “some

21



means of proper judicial process” was necessary but did not
specify what level. Reid, supra, 389 N.J. Super. at 575.

Reid argues that, at a minimum, a valid grand jury subpoena
issued on notice to the subscriber is required. The ACDL
submits that a grand jury subpoena with contemporaneous notice
is required. The ACLU contends that the State should satisfy a
heightened standard in criminal cases either by obtaining
judicial approval or giving notice to the target of the
investigation so that the target can challenge a subpoena. All
three argue that subscriber information is deserving of greater
protection than bank records. They all also cite to a standard
in the civil arena for discovery of information held by an ISP.4
In addition, all three argue that an individual subscriber has a
greater incentive than an ISP in challenging a request by the
State for subscriber information.

Defendant and amici argue that the State should at least berequired to satisfy the standard set forth in Dendrite Int’l,
Inc. v. John Doe No. 3, 342 N.J. Super. 134 (App. Div. 2001).
Dendrite was a civil defamation action in which a corporationsued John Doe defendants for posting a message on an ISP’sbulletin board. Plaintiff sought discovery compelling the ISPto disclose the defendants’ identities. Id. at 140. In
affirming the trial court’s denial of the discovery request, theAppellate Division provided guidance to courts seeking to strikea balance between the First Amendment right to anonymous speechand a defamation claimant’s reputational and proprietaryinterests. Id. at 141-42. We express no view today on theappropriate standard for disclosure of ISP subscriberinformation in civil cases, and we decline to import Dendrite’s
holding to the grand jury context.

22



Recent case law informs our discussion. In McAllister,
supra, this Court concluded that issuance of a grand jury
subpoena to obtain bank records, upon a showing of relevance,
satisfies the constitutional protection against improper
government intrusion. 184 N.J. at 36. The Court further found
that notice to the account holder was not constitutionally
required. Id. at 37. The same principles apply here.

In McAllister, the Court rejected arguments similar to
those advanced in this case. In declining to adopt a heightened
standard of probable cause to support the issuance of a grand
jury subpoena, the Court found guidance in the words of Chief
Justice Weintraub, writing in In re Addonizio, 53 N.J. 107
(1968). He declared that “the ‘probable cause’ required for a
search warrant is foreign to [the grand jury] scene.” Id. at

126. His explanation rings true today:
[A grand jury’s] power to investigate wouldbe feeble indeed if the grand jury had toknow at the outset everything needed to
arrest a man or to invade his home. Nor
would it serve the public interest to stay aprobe until the grand jury reveals what ithas or what it seeks. Such disclosures
could defeat the inquiry and impede the
apprehension of the culprit. This is one of
the reasons why the law cloaks the grandjury investigation with secrecy.

[Ibid.]

Since Addonizio, “New Jersey courts have consistently

affirmed the expansive investigatory power of grand juries.”

23



McAllister, supra, 184 N.J. at 34. That power rests on the
grand jury’s ability to issue subpoenas to gather information --
a power that must always be exercised in good faith and in
accordance with established rules to avoid possible abuses.
Under those rules, grand jury subpoenas may be issued based on a
relevancy standard: the documents must “bear some possible
relationship, however indirect, to the grand jury
investigation.” Ibid. (quoting In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces
Tecum, 167 N.J. Super. 471, 473 (App. Div. 1979) (per curiam)).

More recently, in Domicz, supra, this Court determined that
acquiring electric utility records with a grand jury subpoena
was proper under our Constitution. 188 N.J. at 297. The Court
noted that “whatever privacy interest attached” to utility
records, obtaining them through the use of a grand jury subpoena
satisfies Article I, Paragraph 7, of the State Constitution.
Id. at 297. Again, based on a relevancy standard, the Court
declined to suppress the evidence obtained. Id. at 300.

Utility records expose less information about a person’s
private life than either bank records or subscriber information.
But we see no material difference between bank records and ISP
subscriber information and decline to treat them differently.
They reveal comparably detailed information about one’s private
affairs and are entitled to comparable protection under our law.

24



In both cases, a grand jury subpoena based on a relevancy
standard is sufficient to meet constitutional concerns.

In addition, as in McAllister, we decline to adopt a
requirement that notice be provided to account holders whose
information is subpoenaed. See 184 N.J. at 37-40. For obvious
reasons, notice could impede and possibly defeat the grand
jury’s investigation. Particularly in the case of computers,
unscrupulous individuals aware of a subpoena could delete or
damage files on their home computer and thereby effectively
shield them from a legitimate investigation. Banks maintain
copies of the records they send their customers. But ISP
providers do not have a back-up file of the information
maintained on a home computer. As a result, notice could be
even more damaging to an investigation in this arena.

As we noted in Addonizio and McAllister, “[o]ur grand jury
process -- bounded by relevancy and safeguarded by secrecy --
conforms to our jurisprudence,” and “[t]he New Jersey
Constitution does not require more.” McAllister, supra, 184

N.J. at 42 (citing Addonizio, supra, 53 N.J. at 126-28).
D.
The police in this case used a defective municipal subpoena
to obtain Reid’s ISP subscriber information from Comcast. We
turn now to the consequences that flow from this violation of
her rights.

25



Violations of constitutionally protected rights implicate
the exclusionary rule. Under the exclusionary rule, the State
may not introduce evidence obtained unlawfully by the police;
evidence discovered, directly or indirectly, as a result of a
constitutional violation must be suppressed. State v. Lee, 190

N.J. 270, 277-78 (2007) (citing Wong Sun v. United States, 371
U.S. 471, 487-88, 83 S. Ct. 407, 417, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441, 455
(1963)); State v. Hartley, 103 N.J. 252, 282-83 (1986) (citing
Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 308, 105 S. Ct. 1285, 1292, 84
L. Ed. 2d 222, 231 (1985)). The purpose of the rule is to deter
police misconduct and encourage respect for protected rights.
State v. Worthy, 141 N.J. 368, 385 (1995). As a result, the
subscriber information obtained in this case, by way of a
defective municipal court subpoena, was properly suppressed.5
The subscriber information Comcast disclosed lies at the
core of the indictment against Reid. Without it, she would not
have been identified. It is therefore difficult in this case to
see how the pending indictment can survive suppression. By

The Wiretap Act does not provide an adequate remedy. Under
the Act, an aggrieved person challenging the interception ofcontent information -- such as the contents of an interceptedwire, electronic, or oral communication intercepted unlawfully-- may bring a motion to suppress. N.J.S.A. 2A:156A-21. But an
aggrieved customer whose subscriber information was obtainedwithout a grand jury subpoena, as required by N.J.S.A. 2A:156A29,
may only recover civil damages and attorney’s fees.

N.J.S.A. 2A:156A-32 & -34.
26



contrast, in Hunt, supra, introduction of the toll billing
records was “too insignificant to have had any bearing” on the
trial and was therefore harmless error. 91 N.J. at 350. In
addition, the Court noted that if “subsequently obtained
evidence was acquired from an independent source,” or if the
“causal connection between the illegal conduct and the discovery
of the challenged evidence was ‘so attenuated’ that the taint
was dissipated,” the evidence could be admitted. Id. at 349
(citations omitted). As a result, evidence uncovered through
court orders or search warrants that rested on other lawfully
obtained information was not subject to suppression. Ibid.

Suppression under the circumstances present here does not
mean that the evidence is lost in its entirety. Comcast’s
records existed independently of the faulty process the police
followed. And unlike a confession coerced from a defendant in
violation of her constitutional rights, the record does not
suggest that police conduct in this case in any way affected the
records Comcast kept. As a result, the records can be reliably
reproduced and lawfully reacquired through a proper grand jury
subpoena.

This outcome is readily apparent if viewed in the context
of a motion to quash. Had Comcast sought to quash the municipal
court subpoena, the trial court would have granted that relief
for the same reasons it gave at the motion to suppress. At that

27



point, nothing would have prevented the police from seeking the
subscriber information from Comcast a second time, this time
armed with an appropriate grand jury subpoena. See State v.
Bodtmann, 239 N.J. Super. 33, 46 n.10 (App. Div. 1990)
(explaining that where grant of motion to suppress is not a
ruling on the admissibility of blood alcohol test results
obtained via subpoena, “the decision then would be tantamount to
quashing the subpoena,” in which case police could make
application for new subpoena supported by objective facts known
at or near time of event).

The record in this case includes a police report prepared
before the police sought the defective municipal subpoena.
According to the report, Reid’s employer, Mr. Wilson, relayed to
police that someone used a computer to change his company’s
password and shipping address with his suppliers, that Reid was
the only employee who knew the password, and that he and Reid
had argued earlier in the day before she walked out of the
office. Further, before the municipal subpoena was obtained,
Wilson’s supplier relayed the specific IP address of the
computer that had accessed the supplier’s website and changed
Wilson’s company’s username, password, and shipping address.
Under any reasonable interpretation, the subscriber information
attached to that particular IP address bore “some possible

28



relationship” to the investigation underway. See McAllister,
supra, 184 N.J. at 34.

All of the above information remains untainted by the
results of the defective municipal subpoena. Therefore, the
State may attempt to reacquire Comcast’s records with a proper
grand jury subpoena limited to seeking subscriber information
for the IP address in question.6

To recap, the trial court properly suppressed the
subscriber information obtained, and the State may not proceed
with the pending indictment absent proof that the indictment has
a sufficient basis without relying on the suppressed evidence.
Alternatively, the State may move to dismiss the pending
indictment, re-serve a proper grand jury subpoena on Comcast,
and seek a new indictment.

IV.
For the above reasons, we modify and affirm the judgment of
the Appellate Division and remand to the Law Division for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

JUSTICES LONG, LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, WALLACE, RIVERA-SOTO, andHOENS join in CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER’s opinion.

Reid and the amici curiae also raise questions about thebreadth of the municipal court subpoena served on Comcast.
Comcast provided only subscriber information in response, butReid and the amici argue the subpoena sought additionalinformation that would have required a court order under theWiretap Act. In light of our ruling, we need not resolve thatclaim.

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SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY


NO. A-105 SEPTEMBER TERM 2006
ON APPEAL FROM Appellate Division, Superior Court

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.
SHIRLEY REID,
Defendant-Respondent.

DECIDED April 21, 2008

Chief Justice Rabner PRESIDING

OPINION BY Chief Justice Rabner

CONCURRING/DISSENTING OPINION BY
DISSENTING OPINION BY

CHECKLIST
MODIFY AND
AFFIRM/
REMAND
CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER X
JUSTICE LONG X
JUSTICE LaVECCHIA X
JUSTICE ALBIN X
JUSTICE WALLACE X
JUSTICE RIVERA-SOTO X
JUSTICE HOENS X
TOTALS 7